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Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the changing dynamics in the money
market rates after 2007. It aims to analyse the interest rate channel of monetary policy
transmission until the federal funds target rate reached the zero lower bound. A set of
different model explains both long and short run dynamics of U.S. money market rates up
to 6 months. I find that secured money market rates move together with monetary policy
expectations whereas unsecured interbank rates disconnected from policy rates due to an
increase in both credit and liquidity risks.
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1 Introduction
The subprime crisis triggered a global financial crisis and severely impaired the functioning of the
unsecured interbank market in 2007. This has caused serious disruptions in the transmission
of monetary policy. Unsecured interbank rates decoupled from monetary policy. The U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) responded with severe target rate cuts and launched a series of non-
standard monetary policy measures to improve the funding conditions in the interbank market.
Therefore, the Fed closely tracked the Libor - Overnight Index Swap (LOIS) spread as a measure
how interbank rates responded relative to expected monetary policy rates. Alternatively, the
TED spread, the Libor over the risk-free Treasury bill (Tbill), provides another measure of
money market stress. However, this measure also covers the flight-to-safety effect in government
securities. Figure 1 outlines the movements of the two spreads over time. From visual inspection
it can be inferred that both spreads were both small prior to the crisis. Especially, the LOIS
spread was very small prior to August 2007, whereas the TED spread appears to be larger. What
becomes evident from this Figure is that both spreads follow a different pattern after autumn
2008 and when the zero lower bound (ZLB) in December 2008 was reached.
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Figure 1: 3months maturity spreads (in bps)
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the interest rate channel and to understand
the dynamics in the money market in a crisis environment. I focus on the time period until
December 2008 and analyse both the short and long-run adjustment of different money market
instruments up to 6 months maturity. With respect to crisis and pre-crisis literature, I employ
three different empirical models to evaluate how the interest rate channel is affected in an
environment of high uncertainty about funding conditions.
First, in line with the crisis literature, I examine the interrelationship between Libor spreads
during the financial crisis and how they respond to policy announcements. I find that Libor
spreads co-move during the crisis period up to 6 months maturity due to the link between
monetary policy expectations and secured interbank rates. Second, similar to pre-crisis pass-
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through models, I investigate the interest rate channel by estimating the long-run relationship of
unsecured interbank rates, monetary policy expectations, and risks. I find that the relationship
deteriorated since rates are subject to additional drivers such as credit and liquidity risk. The
third approach concentrates on the dynamics of the interbank rates during the crisis. I investigate
how interbank rates respond to monetary policy, liquidity and credit risk shocks. Findings show
that the interbank rate respond to the shocks in credit risk and monetary policy expectations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I briefly summarise the
literature about monetary policy transmission both prior and during the crisis. Section 3 presents
the data and preliminary tests. Section 4 documents the empirical analysis including three
different econometric approaches. Section 5 documents and discusses the findings. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The money markets play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy. By controlling
the amount of reserves, most central banks set a short-term rate and rates at the longer end
of the yield curve convey information about expected path of monetary policy. The concept
of the expectation hypothesis explains how interest rates are tied together. In the U.S., the
effective federal funds rate is the average overnight rate at which regulated financial institution
lend balances among each other to meet their reserve requirements1 at the Fed. The central
bank announces a price for these reserves, the overnight federal funds target rate. Through
the implementation of the monetary policy such as open market operations (OMO), temporary
or permanent, the Fed determines the level of reserves and therefore steers the level of the
effective federal funds rate. The next step is that expectations about future changes in the
overnight rate affect the level of longer-term interest rates such as the Libor. The Libor is the
reference rate for the unsecured money market and has become the benchmark for the pricing
a large number of various financial contracts thereby affecting other segments of the broader
financial markets and the entire economy. This transmission mechanism is called the interest
rate channel. The crisis deeply distorted this channel. On August 9, 2007 when the French
bank BNP Paribas announced its losses associated to toxic assets on U.S. subprime mortgages,
it marked the beginning of the financial crisis which generated uncertainty about funding costs
in the interbank market. Spreads between secured and unsecured interbank rates at 3 months
maturity mirrored the stress in the money markets. The Fed’s effort to ease market conditions
through OMO did not improve the tight funding situation in the interbank market. Due to
the increase in uncertainty about the counterparty risk, financial institutions became reluctant
to lend among each other. The Fed launched several programmes such as the Term Auction
Facility (TAF). The auction mechanism, similar to repurchase agreements (Repo) but with more
counterparties admitted, with a maturity of 28 days, was however neutralised through OMO,
so that the liquidity in the financial system remained unchanged. After the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in fall 2008, disruptions on the interbank market intensified. Due to intense
surge for liquidity, the Fed was no longer able to sterilise the liquidity injections by OMO. As
1Reserve requirements are the amount of funds that a bank must hold in reserves against specified deposit
liabilities on average over a maintenance period of two weeks.
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a result, the increased liquidity in the system put pressure on the effective federal funds rate.
To provide a floor for the federal funds rate the central bank started paying interest rates on
both required and excess reserves starting with the maintenance period beginning on October
9, 2008. Nevertheless, on December 16, 2008 the target rate reached a near zero target range,
the so-called zero lower bound. In order to further ease market conditions, the Fed started
purchasing assets with medium and long maturities (see i.e. Gagnon et al. [2010]). Over the
first half of the year 2009, money market spreads declined steadily (see Figure 1).
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, its distortions in the money markets and the effects of
the unconventional measures by the central banks resulted in a large branch of literature. This
section is divided into two parts, First it provide a brief overview of the crisis literature.2 Next,
it summaries empirical work about the transmission of monetary policy prior to the crisis and
how monetary policy implementation affects the interest rate channel.
2.1 Money market spreads and the financial crisis
Empirical results about the reason for the elevated LOIS spread and the effectiveness of the Fed’s
liquidity programmes are controversial. Studying the period prior to fall 2008, the first stream of
literature (i.a. McAndrews et al. [2008], Wu [2008], Michaud and Upper [2008] ) employs a type
of event studies and merely conclude that the spread corresponds to both increased liquidity3
and counterparty risk, while Taylor and Williams [2009] finds the TAF measures to be ineffective
and finds evidence of increased counterparty risk. In Europe i.a. Schwarz [2010]; Abbassi and
Linzert [2012]; or de Socio [2013] attribute some of the spreads increase to liquidity risk. Most
papers use a measure of financial credit default spreads as an approximation of counterparty
risk, whereas measuring the liquidity component in the spreads more difficult. Some work, i.e.
of England [2007], simply decompose the spread into a credit and noncredit risk component by
subtracting the counterparty risk measure and assume orthogonally between the components.
This methodology, however, can cause problems as risk measure are highly correlated and an
instrument as for example the credit default swaps spread is likely to reflect liquidity risk as
well. The difficulty in the spreads’ decomposition into a liquidity and credit risk component,
switches attention to the theoretical literature which describes how shocks can dry up market-
wide liquidity. Heider et al. [2009] examines how counterparty risk can affect interbank markets
and result in a reduction in liquidity due to adverse selection and market participants can no
longer distinguish between good or bad counterparties. Uncertainty increases and markets may
freeze. Furfine [2001] models the overnight market and shows how a certain level of counterparty
risk and hence increased borrowing costs can prevent others participants from entering the
market. Other literature including Allen et al. [2009] focus on the role of liquidity hoarding and
conclude that banks are unwilling to lend due to precautionary reasons regardless the borrower
quality of other market participants. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009] analyse the effects of
market liquidity shocks and explain the link between funding and market liquidity during a
crisis.
2For a detailed discussion of the literature and measures adopted by the Fed please see to Cecioni et al. [2011]
3Most researchers refer to the concept of funding liquidity. Funding liquidity risk is agent-specific, whereas
market liquidity risk depends on the asset. These measures, however, are related (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[2009]). For a description about funding and market liquidity risk see BIS [2008].
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Another branch of literature examines the tensions in the overnight market during the crisis
empirically. For further information see Bech and Klee [2010]; Afonso et al. [2011] or for Europe
Beirne [2012].
2.2 Monetary policy transmission and implementation prior to the crisis
Interest rates tend to move together. This subject has been broadly studied in economics
and finance. For monetary policy transmission, understanding the relationship between the
overnight rate and money market rates is of major concern. Prior to autumn 2008, the Federal
Reserve implemented monetary policy by targeting the effective Fed funds rate and hence, by
controlling the supply of reserves. Followed by the expectations about actual and expected future
federal funds rates, the central bank steered the movements to longer-term rates. Since 2007
the attention paid on the dynamics of money markets rates has increased due to its dominant
role in the transmission mechanism. Two branches of literature are presented below. First,
the pass-through mechanism from shorter to longer term rates and the associated literature is
outlined. Second, given the importance of the proper functioning of the overnight markets, a
brief summary of papers on the federal funds dynamics are documented.
2.2.1 Expectation hypothesis and the money market rates
As mentioned before, typically, one attributes the co-movements of interest rates to the theory of
the expectation hypothesis. According to the expectation hypothesis it is assumed that longer-
term interest rates are determined by an average of current and expected future short-term
rates plus a time-invariant, constant term premium. The theory implies that the short and
longer term rates co-move proportionally in the long-run equilibrium but possibly diverge in
the short-run. Campbell and Shiller [1987] argue that the spread between two rates measures
anticipated changes in short-term interest rates. In other words, the information inherent in the
spread forecast changes in the short rates. They refer to the market participants’ forward-looking
behavior. Stock and Watson [1988] refer to a common stochastic trend driving the interest rates.
Evidence for the expectation hypothesis, especially in the case of the effective federal funds rate
as short-term interest rate, is mostly weak. Although, the interest rates mostly move tandem
in the long-run, they do not move proportionally (see Sarno and Thornton [2003]). Previous
literature interprets this finding as a rejection of the expectations hypothesis and concludes
the presence of a time-varying term premium. Cointegration and error correction models are a
possible way to assess the relationship between interest rates. The forces that generate a long-
run relation between rates at different maturities imply a mean reversion of the interest rate
spread and the existence of an error correction model which defines the dynamic relationship
between two (or more) rates. Some of the papers argue that the strength of the link between
interest rates has not been constant through time, and depends on the targeting procedure of the
federal funds rate (see i.a. Hall et al. [1992], Zhou [2007]). Analysing Treasury yields, Hall et al.
[1992] find that under uncertainty, the cointegration relationship may break due to an additional
trend. Similarly, IMF [2008] find a break the long-run pass-through between effective federal
funds rate and Libor as a response to the money market turmoil in 2007. Another branch of
literature examines the pass-through mechanism from money market rates to bank retail rates
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(see i.e. de Bondt [2005], Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells [2011]).
2.2.2 Federal funds rate dynamics
Due to the importance of the federal funds market in conducting the monetary policy, I present
previous literature about the overnight market and the implementation of monetary policy. In
the U.S., the effective federal funds rate is the first stage for the monetary policy transmis-
sion. Since the 1980’s the Fed has had a target for the federal funds rate. However, only after
1994 the FOMC decisions about a target rate changes were announced right after the meeting
which has drawn more attention to the federal funds behaviour. In 2000 the Fed enhanced
its communication with the introduction of the so-called balance of risk statement which has
improved transparency of the policy [Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007]. In terms of reserve re-
quirements, the Fed changed from contemporaneous to the lagged reserve computation in 1998.
Under contemporaneous reserve computation depository institution did only knew their level of
reserve requirements on the day prior to the end of maintenance period. Whereas under the
lagged reserve computation practice, banks know the level of required reserves in advance of a
maintenance period. Previous literature, mostly following the seminal paper of Hamilton [1996],
show how central bank’s operational framework, communication or the reserve requirement can
influence both mean and volatility of the federal funds rate. As monetary policy in the U.S.
has become more transparent and predictable, the anticipation of changes to the target rate
led to movements in the funds rate before many target rate changes. The role of expectations
in the reserve market was analysed by Taylor [2001]. Demiralp and Jordá [2004] demonstrate
the importance of the announcement effects after 1994, in contrast to the conventional liquidity
effect. Nautz and Schmidt [2009] find that increased transparency since 1994 has influenced
the dynamics of the federal funds rate. Volatility in the overnight market is mostly associated
with banks’ daily liquidity management rather than the path of future monetary policy, but
communication and implementation may also affect the overnight volatility. Thus, Nautz and
Schmidt [2009] find that communication and transparency also improved federal funds volatility.
Additionally, their findings indicate that federal funds volatility negatively depends on the level
of required reserves on total deposits. Other papers also examine the volatility transmission
from overnight to longer term money markets (see i.e. Ayuso et al. [1997], Wetherilt [2003],
Lee [2006], Nautz and Offermanns [2008], Colarossi and Zaghini [2009]). Since volatility in the
overnight market can blur signals about the future stance of monetary policy, excess volatility
and potential transmission to longer term rates has to be avoided. In extreme circumstances,
it can affect how well the central bank is able to steer the interest rates, causing a loss of the
central bank’s credibility in conducting monetary policy. In Europe, Nautz and Offermanns
[2008] find a significant volatility transmission even for the twelve-month money market rates;
distinguishing between seasonal volatility and non-seasonal volatility. Whereas seasonal volat-
ility in the overnight market associated with e.g. the end of the maintenance period effects,
is not transmitted to longer term interest rates, non-seasonal volatility4 is transmitted along
the yield curve. According to them, this may indicate that transmission of overnight volatility
along the yield curve is a relevant issue in case they reflect uncertainty about monetary policy.
4Conditional Eonia variance estimated at days unrelated to seasonal effects.
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Colarossi and Zaghini [2009] find that the volatility transmission in the U.S. has disappeared
after 2000. However, they also attribute this finding to other reasons such as the period of
moderation in macroeconomic developments or innovations in the financial markets which may
have contributed to the low interest rate volatility until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007.
3 Data and preliminary tests
Before presenting the three empirical models to obtain insights about the interest rate channel,
I briefly present the data and tests to determine the order of integration of the time series. The
table in the Appendix A.1 provides an overview and description of the data in this paper. The
data covers instruments used in previous studies. My analysis covers a daily frequency sample
on U.S. money market rates for 1, 3 and 6 months from 03/03/2003 to 12/15/2008. The starting
point of this analysis is an eye inspection of the dynamics of various secured but also unsecured
money market rates. Figure 2 plots the difference between the overnight index swap rate and
the Tbill which is likely to indicate a permanent change around the end 2008. The zero lower
bound and the dramatic increase in the Fed’s balance sheet mark the start of a new operational
framework. Figure 2 also presents the dynamics of 3month Libor, OIS and Tbill over the last
ten years. Secured rates such as the Tbill were also disrupted after August 2007 but less heavily
than unsecured interbank funding rates. Hence, the break given by the operational change in
monetary policy is more easily detected in their difference5.
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
tbill3‐ois3 libor tbill ois
Figure 2: Rates at 3months maturity (in bps) and the Tbill-OIS spread
In summary, the following money market rates and measures of risk are included in my
empirical study:
• Unsecured interbank rates: Libor, Eurodollar, and certificate of deposit rate
Libor is the London interbank offered rate. Calculated by daily survey of international banks
in London just prior to 11 a.m. Eurodollar on the other hand, are best offered rates on offshore
USD Certificate of deposit (CD) brokered by ICAP around 9.30 a.m. in New York6. Certificate
5In line with this, also Bech et al. [2012] find that the pass-through from the federal funds rate to the overnight
GC Repo deteriorated at the ZLB as response of limited arbitrage and idiosyncratic market factors.
6See Gyntelberg and Wooldridge [2008] who assess the fixing of the different interbank rates.
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of deposits are another funding source on the interbank market offered to individuals in the
U.S..
• Secured money market rates: Tbill, GC Repo rate
Government securities as the Tbills are due to their market liquidity, favourable tax treatment7
and lack of default risks, popular money market rates. Thus, the range of investors is rather
heterogeneous. During times of stress, investors shift their attention to first-rate collateral, which
results in a flight-to-safety effect [McCauley and McGuire, 2009]. General collateral repurchase
agreements are secured financial contracts that allow borrowers to use Tbills as collateral for
cash loans at a fixed interest rates [Hördahl and King, 2008]. Bloomberg, however, only offers
ICAP brokered GC Repo rates at 3months maturity.
• Monetary policy expectations: OIS rate
A OIS is a interest rate swap contract that consists of a floating and a fixed rate leg. The
floating rate is tied to the the geometric average of the effective federal funds rate over each
time interval of the contract. At maturity of the contract, the two counterparties swap the
difference between interest accrued at an pre-determined fixed rate and the floating rate on the
notional amount of the contract. Therefore, the fixed rate reflects the expected Federal funds
rate over the term of the swap plus a small premium. The counterparty paying the floating rate
bears the risk of future interest changes. On the other hand, the contract ensures longer-term
funding near the overnight rate and hence the investor agrees on paying a premium, rather than
rolling funds on a daily basis [see Sengupta and Tam, 2008]. The term OIS rate refers to the
fixed rate of the contract. Rather than using the federal funds rate, I employ models with a
measure of expected monetary policy over the same term as the unsecured rates. In line with
the expectation hypothesis, subtracting the OIS rate from unsecured interbank rates, the spread
should then represent a pure measure of interbank risk [Taylor and Williams, 2009].
• Credit risk: Median of 5years credit default swap spreads
The median of credit default swap spreads is calculated from the Libor panel banks following
previous literature such as Taylor and Williams [2009]. For detailed information about the credit
default swaps refer to Blanco et al. [2005].
• Liquidity measures: Federal funds rate volatility
The first source of liquidity for banks is the overnight federal funds market where the operat-
ing framework of the Fed is designed to meet the banks’ demand for reserves. The market’s
important role is highlighted in the literature review. Volatility in overnight market can create
uncertainty over funding costs and blur the signals from monetary policy. In this paper I distin-
guish between two different measures of the overnight volatility; realised and implied volatility
(IV). Note that various other papers also investigate the conditional volatility computed from
GARCH models [Ayuso et al., 1997]. A drawback of the conditional volatility is that it relies on
7Income tax on Treasury bills is exempt from both state and local income taxes.
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the model specifications and may be sensitive to breaks. Therefore, realised volatility provides
a more reliable estimate of the observed overnight volatility. In this paper, the realised federal
funds volatility is estimated as the mean absolute deviation from the target rate over the past
30 days [see Hilton, 2005, Carpenter and Demiralp, 2011]8. In contrast, the IV derived from
options of federal funds futures is related to the realised volatility and can be seen as predictors
of the realised volatility [Neely, 2004]. Since federal funds futures measure the average expected
federal funds rate over a month, I derive the IV from the second Nearby contract in order to
not to infer with realised volatility.
Referring to theoretical papers summarised in the literature review under 2.1, one has to bear
in mind, that volatility in the overnight market and counterparty risk can be related. Uncertainty
about counterparty risk may encourage financial institutions to hoard excess reserves and cause
an evaporation of the market liquidity [see e.g. Heider et al., 2009]. According to Carpenter and
Demiralp [2011], realised volatility explains major parts of the 3 months LOIS spread. Figure 3
shows the LOIS spread relative to CDS median and the absolute daily deviation of federal funds
rate from the target rate. The black line represents the target rate change to the range of 0
to 0.25 percent (ZLB) on December 16, 2008. One can observe that the CDS measure remains
elevated after December 2008 but the LOIS spread declines in 2009.
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Figure 3: LOIS spread at 3months maturity (in bps) and risk measures
8Papers such as Carpenter and Demiralp [2011] or Durré and Nardelli [2008] calculate real-
ised volatility from intraday data. Series for federal funds intraday volatility can be collected on:
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm
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3.1 Order of integration
To examine the long-run properties between interest rates, it is necessary to test for a stochastic
trend in the first place. However, by definition of conventional economic and finance theory
bounded variables like interest rates should be stationary. Having said that, various research-
ers treat interest rates as integrated processes. Empirical literature on interest rates, starting
with Engle and Granger [1987], either assumes or finds that interest rates to be nonstation-
ary. Moreover, Hall et al. [1992] shows that even interest rate spreads of different maturity can
become nonstationary during time of stress. In order to determine the order of integration, I
apply different unit root and stationarity tests; such as the Augmented Dickey fuller (ADF),
the Phillips-Perron (PP), the Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmid-Shin (KPSS) and Elliott-Rothenberg-
Stock (ERS). All tests are computed on the level and on first differences. Also, Schwartz (SBC)
as well as Akaike (AIC) criterion are considered in ADF and ERS tests. The Appendix A.2
provides a short description of the tests. All tests are performed at 5 per cent significance
level. A potential drawback of the standard unit root and stationarity tests is that they may
be biased in the presence of structural breaks. I circumvent this problem by testing different
sub periods: entire sample: 03/03/2003 - 12/15/2008, pre-crisis: 03/03/2003 - 08/08/2007, and
crisis 08/09/2007 - 12/15/2008. Findings are summarised in the Appendix A.2. A summary of
the tests on the spread between secured and unsecured rates is listed in Table 1. As discussed
in Hall et al. [1992] the H0 for an unit root cannot be rejected for ADF, PP and ERS and the
H0 of stationarity can mostly be rejected at 5 per cent9. Moreover, the test statistics for the
pre-crisis period concerning the realised federal funds rate volatility show mixed results. When
determining the lag length with SBC criterion, the time series is clearly I(0) for ADF, ERS and
PP. Lag length by AIC, on the other hand, indicates that the volatility contains a stochastic
trend. However, based on the findings, I assume all series to be I(1) and this motivates the
investigation of common trends.
REPO 
spread
1M 3M 6M 1M 3M 6M 3M
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
ADFa LEVEL I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
DIFFERENCE I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
PP LEVEL I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
DIFFERENCE I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
ERSa LEVEL I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
DIFFERENCE I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
KPSS LEVEL I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1)
DIFFERENCE I(0) I(0) I(0) ‐ I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: a lag length with AIC, SBC. Tests performed at 5 per cent significance level.
LOIS TED
Table 1: Order of integration during the crisis
9Only the TED spread at 1month maturity is found to be I(0) following the KPSS methodology.
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4 Empirical analysis
The major objective of this paper is to gain insights about the interest rate channel. This section
describes three models analysing the behaviour of the money market rates in the short and long-
run. First, estimating a bivariate framework, I evaluate the dynamics of Libor spreads during
the crisis. The movements of the different Libor spreads as indicator of interbank health were
analysed intensively in previous literature. The first model estimates the joint dynamics and
measures possible effects from monetary policy actions. Second, with respect to previous pass-
through models, I examine the movements of the interbank rates, both in mean and volatility,
allowing for additional long-run trends in the mean. The sample covers a longer observation
period including both pre-crisis and the crisis until December 2008. Third, I estimate a reduced
form VAR over the crisis period. In order not to impose too many restrictions, the long-run
properties in the data are not explicitly modeled. Within this framework I analyse how the
interbank rates at different maturities react to unexpected movements liquidity, and credit risk
but also to shocks in expectations about future path of monetary policy.
4.1 Bivariate VECM
Since initial testing indicated that money market spreads are I(1), a bivariate Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM) is specified to model the relationship between LOIS and either TED
or Repo spread during the crisis. The aim of this approach is to analyse whether the money
markets share a common trend. In case of the LOIS spread, the expected future policy rates are
deducted, so that the spread should represent a pure measure of risk. The TED spread, however,
is more likely to represent the flight to quality effect in the secured treasury market. Tbills are
link to the monetary policy through the Repo market, where they serve as a collateral. Therefore,
subsequently I also analyse dynamics between the LOIS spread and the spread between the
Libor and GC Repo rates. Taylor and Williams [2009] use this spread as measure of credit
risk by subtracting the secured funding rate for financial institutions from the unsecured Libor
rate. However, the GC Repo rates are affected by liquidity risk too as they are linked to the
underlying collateral (see i.a. Hördahl and King [2008]). So, if spreads are cointegrated, the
pass through from monetary policy to secured rates, represented by the relationship between
OIS and Tbill, Repo respectively, continued. As discussed previously, I estimate a reduced crisis
sample: 08/09/2007 to 12/15/2008.
I first tested for cointegration with the two-step by Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris
approaches. Further information about the testing procedure as well as the outputs are reported
in the Appendix A.3. Then, I estimate a bivariate reduced-form VAR to determine the number
of lags for the Johansen test. The lag length is first selected with the more parsimonious SBC in
order to avoid overfitting the model. If the Lagrange multiplier test statistics reveal remaining
reasonable autocorrelation in the residuals, Hannah Quinn (HQ), AIC and then LR statistic
are taken into account.10 This procedure is repeated until the residuals appear to be white
noise. Finally, the stability of the VAR is considered by checking the inverse roots of the AR
10Overparametrisation is considered to be larger problem than remaining autocorrelation after ten business
days.
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Exogenous 
variables
Proxy for Literature expected 
impact
d(fftr) b
Immediate short‐run pass‐through effect 
after a target change. i.a. Bartolini and Prati, 2006 +
D taf
Term auction facility announcements by 
the FED.
McAndrews, 2009 and 
Carpenter et al., 2013
‐
news c
Macro news to account for other 
announcement effects than target 
changes: Surprise component subtracted 
from consumer confidence, retail sales, 
production  and unemployment
i.a. Andersen et al. 2002; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2007; Moessner and Nelson, 
2008
+/‐
X
End of month, quarter, year and events. 
Dummy to control for events such as 
Lehman.
i.a. Hamilton, 1996 +/‐
Notes: bOther studies question the target rate to be an exogenous variables (see i.a. 
Thornton, 2004). c The macro news are calculated relative to the median of the Bloomberg 
survey and are normalised by their standard deviation.
Table 2: List of exogenous variables for the VECM
characteristics polynomial. Next, I perform the Johansen test. Since there are only two variables,
I test for one cointegrating vector. At last, I specify the following VECM
∆tedt =
p−1∑
i=1
φted1i ∆tedt−i +
p−1∑
i=1
φted2i ∆loist−i + α1ECTt−1 + tedt (1)
∆loist =
p−1∑
i=1
φted1i ∆loist−i +
p−1∑
i=1
φlois2i ∆tedt−i + α2ECTt−1 + loist (2)
ECTt = tedt − c− βloist (3)
Adding the error correction term (ECT) to a VAR model in differences produces the VECM.
The ECT, however, is restricted to a constant term. The speed of adjustments parameters,
denoted by α1 and α2, measure the degree to which the spreads adjust to correct deviations from
long-run relationship. The coefficients of φ measure the short-run impact. A set of exogenous
variables enters the VAR to control for immediate effects on the short-run dynamics. I control
for policy announcements but also the impact from macroeconomic news and calendar effects.
The variables are listed separately in Table 2.
I also consider the half-life responses of both spreads after a shock. This measure gives an
idea about the period of adjustment. Note that the long-run relationship estimated with β links
to the speed of adjustment parameters to the cointegrating error. The error from the long-run
equilibrium is an AR(1) process. Under the assumption of a VAR(1) model, the cointegration
error can be modeled as in Equation 4
ECTt = (1− α1 − α2β)ECTt−1 + tedt + loist β (4)
For an stationary AR(1) process, the speed of mean-reversion is measured by the half-life
defined as
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k = ln(0.5)/lnθ (5)
whereas in the VAR(1) case
θ = 1− α1 − α2β1 (6)
(see for example Tsay [2005], pp.49). Therefore, only if the absolute value of θ is smaller
than one, the linear combination of the two variables is I(0) [Johansen, 2009, pp. 676]. It is
crucial to reconsider that while the adjustments to the cointegration error may differ for each
variable in terms of magnitude, the time to adjust to the new equilibrium is the same for both
spreads. However, if one variable is weakly exogenous than it immediately adjust to the new
equilibrium [Morley, 2007].
4.2 EGARCH model with error correction term
This model relates to the pre-crisis literature as described in literature review under 2.2.1 to
2.2.2. According to the expectations hypothesis, interest rates move together, as longer-term
rates should be equal to the expected short-term rate over the same term as the longer rate plus
a constant risk premium. Initial testing showed that the spread between secured and unsecured
rates over the same term became nonstationary. Various paper studies this long-run relation
among interest rates of different maturities using cointegration methodologies in the pre-crisis
period [Hall et al., 1992, Sarno and Thornton, 2003, de Bondt, 2005, Zhou, 2007, Biefang-
Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2011]. In line with them, this section focuses the pass-through
from monetary policy including both the crisis and pre-crisis period. Since unsecured market
rates disconnected from the target rate, I need additional variables to describe the long-run
relationship between monetary policy and unsecured interest rates so that the residuals become
stationary. Following Carpenter and Demiralp [2011] I adopt an error correction model including
the realised federal funds volatility as risk premium. Their sample lasts until 2010, whereas mine
only covers 2003 to 2008. Considering the dynamics of the spreads in the previous section, from
a visual inspection one can see a break in the end of 2008. After the Fed had cut interest rate
to zero on December 16, 2008, expectations about future monetary policy, proxied by the OIS
rate, and but also the volatility in the federal funds rate were tied to the floor of the federal
funds rate (see Gagnon and Sack [2014] for more information). In other words, with the interest
rates at the ZLB, the Fed no longer uses the effective federal funds rate as its operational target.
The traditional interest rate channel has changed and the Fed operates through other channels.
These, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. I first perform residual-based cointegration
tests by Engle Granger and Phillips Ouliaris. A further indication whether the variables are
cointegrated is a statistically significant adjustment coefficient in the error correction model.
Both tests are performed for the sample period 03/03/2003 to 12/15/2008 including both the
crisis and pre-crisis period. I tested twice using AIC as well as the more parsimonious SBC
criterion. I also tested the pre-crisis period, checking whether unsecured interbank rates were
cointegrated with OIS rates prior to the crisis. Next, the model is estimated in two steps.
First I estimate the long-run relationship of the variables with dynamic OLS (DOLS) as in
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Equation 7. Next, I estimate error correction equations in a similar fashion as being estimated
in the previous literature (see for example Nautz and Schmidt [2009]). I adopt an EGARCH
model to analyse both the mean and the time-varying volatility of the daily unsecured interbank
rates. As mentioned before, I employ a model including the realised federal funds volatility as
Carpenter and Demiralp [2011]. The model of Carpenter and Demiralp [2011] is augmented
in two ways. First, estimations of the long-run relation are performed with dynamic OLS
(DOLS) to receive consistent, asymptotically normally distributed and efficient estimates of the
cointegrating vector. This methodology by Stock and Watson [1993] results in robust estimators
for small samples and corrects the bias, simultaneity and serial correlation problems. DOLS
corrects for parameter and standard error bias through the addition of leads and lags of the
first difference of all right-hand side variables, as shown in equation 7. Moreover, concerning the
time period covered, it tends to be more robust than the Johansen methodology in the presence
varying adjustments to the long-run equilibrium. In contrast, Carpenter and Demiralp [2011]
estimated the level relationship with OLS.
The error correction term ECTt can be easily calculated as in Equation 8. rt represents
the Libor at either 1, 3 or 6months maturity. For robustness, I also estimate the model with
Certificate of deposit rates and offshore Eurodollar rates. The oist corresponds to same maturity
as the unsecured rate. The ffvt represents the realised volatility over the past 30 days.
rt = β0 + β1oist + β2ffvt +
p∑
i=−r
β3i∆oist−i +
p∑
i=−r
β4i∆ffvt−i + ϑt (7)
ECT dolst = rt − β0 − β1oist + β2ffvt (8)
The second modification from Carpenter and Demiralp [2011] approach is that I adopt error
correction model (ECM) as in Equation 9. The ECM is modeled in standard way where the
differenced unsecured interbank rate is regressed on the lagged ECTt term and on the lagged
differenced variables from long-run framework. This model specification resembles other single
equation error correction models by including it in a GARCH framework to model both the
mean and time-varying volatility of the daily unsecured interbank rates. Additionally I control
for contemporaneous short-run impacts on both mean and also, impacts on the volatility with a
set of different variables mentioned in former literature (see Table 3 for a complete list of those).
∆rt =
n∑
i=1
φ1,i∆rt−i +
o∑
i=1
φ2,i∆oist−i +
m∑
i=1
φ3,i∆ffvt−i + αECT dolst−1
+δ1fst + δ2fst ∗Dcrisist +
5∑
l=1
δ3,lD
TAF
t,l +
4∑
l=1
δ4,lnewst,l + ϕ′X1t + φ0 + σtεt
(9)
The immediate impact of the surprise in monetary policy fst is extracted from federal funds
futures following the Kuttner [2001] methodology. The unanticipated target rate change is
calculated from daily change of the first nearby contract f0 of the federal funds futures11. Since
a futures contract represents the average expected effective federal funds rate, one has to weigh
11The contract is rolled on the last business day of the month.
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the change in federal funds futures contract from day t − 1 to t. D represents the number of
days of the current month and d the day of the month.
fst =
D
D − d(f
0
t − f0t−1) (10)
On the first day of the month, I use the second nearby contract for the last day rather than
the first. Another exemption are the last three days of the month when the unscaled difference
between second nearby contracts is taken into account12. δ2 controls whether the impact of
an unexpected policy rate has changed during the crisis. Additionally, I follow McAndrews
et al. [2008] and control for various announcement effects related to the TAF after December
200713. news represents a set of variables accounting for the surprise components extracted from
macroeconomic releases to control for other announcements than those from the central bank.
The surprise components from macroeconomic releases are calculated relative to the median of
the Bloomberg survey and are normalised by their standard deviation. For both macroeconomic
news and monetary policy surprises, I construct series which are set to 0 on days without news
and denote for the surprise component on the announcement days.
To account for the time varying volatility and hence following other papers who have docu-
mented asymmetric responses of volatility to money market rates shocks, I estimate an exponen-
tial GARCH model (EGARCH). Since this augmented GARCH model estimates the conditional
variance process in logs, there is no need for non negativity constraints. Additionally, the EG-
ARCH benefits from additional leverage terms to capture the asymmetry in volatility clustering.
Following the seminal paper of Hamilton [1996], who suggests that Federal funds rate volatility
is characterised by asymmetric responses to interest rate shocks, other work apply the similar
approach for money market rates, especially for Treasury securities (see i.a. Ayuso et al. [1997],
Ehrmann and Fratzscher [2007], Lee [2006]). The sample period is longer than in the other two
models. The reason for this is twofold. First, it allows estimating the interest rate channel in
both the pre-crisis and crisis period and second, due to possible structural breaks in the sample
during the crisis, GARCH models respond slowly and a larger amount of data is required . The
volatility Equation 11 is estimated as follows:
log(σ2t ) = w + γ1 |
εt−1
σt−1
| +γ2 εt−1
σt−1
+ γ3log(σ2t−1)
+υ1 | fst | +υ2 | fst | Dcrisist +
5∑
l=1
υ3,lD
TAF
t,l +
4∑
l=1
υ4,l | newst,l |
+υ5DFOMCt + υ6Dcrisist + υ7DIORt + υ8D
postLB
t + θ′X2t + t
(11)
The conditional variance and the conditional mean equation, are jointly estimated with the
Quasi maximum likelihood technique. There are leverage effects if the γ2 is statistically signi-
ficant. Ehrmann and Fratzscher [2007] state it is possible that monetary policy announcements
may provoke an immediate positive reaction on the mean of the rates and at the same reduce
uncertainty as reflected in conditional volatility over time. If markets know the future path of
12It is assumed that there are no more than one target change each month.
13The set of TAF dummy variables are the same as for the bivariate VECM.
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monetary policy, there are relatively small effects on conditional market volatility after a target
rate change. Therefore as in the mean equation, I control whether absolute policy surprises fst
affect interest rate volatility. Also, I control whether the absolute impact on interest rate volat-
ility after an unexpected policy rate change has increased during the crisis. Dummies account
for increased volatility on the FOMC meetings days or overall heightened uncertainty during
the crisis and another shift dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Plus,
I augment the model with a shift dummy DIORt to investigate the impact of the introduction
of the remunerated reserves on interest rate volatility. Nautz and Schmidt [2009] suggested
the introduction of remunerated reserves to have a negative impact on federal funds volatility
and since realised volatility increased risk premium in the mean, I also control whether it has
an negative effect on the longer term interbank rates volatility. A set of dummy variables Xt
captures the possible calendar effects of the volatility of the unsecured interbank rates and for
events such as August 9, 2007 to capture outliers. Additionally, as in the mean equation, the
volatility equations is also control for the impact of releases about macroeconomic fundamentals.
The short-run impact variables on the mean as well as the variables in the volatility equation
and their expected impact are summarised in Table 3.
This methodology differs from previous studies about the interest rate channel since they
mostly analyse the monetary transmission from shorter to longer term interest rates. One pos-
sible drawback is outlined in previous bivariate (or multivariate) studies such as Sarno and
Thornton [2003] who often argue that the policy rate adjusts to the longer term rates, whereas
the longer term rates is weakly exogenous. One explanation is given by the argument that longer
term rates contain information about future short term rate [Campbell and Shiller, 1987]. The
expected path of monetary policy is proxied by the OIS rate over the maturity as the unsecured
rate and it is therefore more likely to assume that money market rates adjusts to their changes.
By including a variables to proxy risk premium, this modeling framework allows studying the
long-run transmission of monetary policy to unsecured interbank rates and their speed of ad-
justments to the new equilibrium. Moreover, the use of different interbank instruments enables
to compare the Libor rate. Especially, I am interested in the speed of adjustment of the CD
rates at various maturities in comparison to the Libor and ED rate. If financial institutions were
liquidity constrained, the CD market, where lenders are non-banks, should adjust more strongly
to restore the equilibrium relationship.
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Variables Proxy for Literature expected 
impact
Mean Eq.
fs
Immediate short‐run pass‐through, 
surprise component from FF futures.
Kuttner, 2001 +
D (taf)
A set of variables to capture possible 
effects from the announcements of TAF.
McAndrews, 2009 and 
Carpenter et al. 2013
‐
news
Macro news to account for other 
announcement effects : Surprise 
component subtracted from consumer 
confidence, retail sales, production  and 
unemployment.
i.a. Anderesen et al., 2007; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2007; Moessner and Nelson, 
2008
+ b
X
Calendar effects: end of month, quarter 
and year and dummies to control for 
events outliers.
+/‐
Volatility Eq.
D TAF
TAF effects could either calm markets or 
create higher uncertainty.
+/‐
|fs|
Absolute surprise component of target 
rate change from FF futures.
i.a. Kuttner, 2001; Lee, 2006; 
Nautz and Schmidt, 2009
+
D crisis
Accounting for the heightened 
uncertainty in financial markets – shift 
dummy from Aug 9, 2007.
+
D postLB
Shift Dummy to account for the 
heightended uncertainty following the 
collapse of Lehman on Sept 15, 2008.
+
D IOR
Denotes for 1 after the launch of 
remunerated reserves on Oct 9, 2008. 
‐
|news|
According to Andersen et al., 2007 
volatility tends to be highest around 
macro announcements.
i.a. Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2007; Andersen et al. 2007
+
D FOMC
Accounting for the heightened 
uncertainty at FOMC meeting days.
+
X
Calendar effects: end of month, quarter 
and year and uncertainty around 
specific events.
+
Notes: b Unemployment is expected to reduce the mean.
Table 3: List of variables in EGARCH model
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4.3 VAR on levels
Whereas the previous models distinguished between permanent and transitory components of
the dynamics, within this subsection a simple reduced-form vector autoregressive (VAR) model
is fitted to levels despite the variables’ unit roots. This is a common approach in VAR modeling,
ignoring long-run properties in order not to impose too many restrictions which could appear
when imposing inappropriate cointegration relations and hence, could lead to biased estimates.
The aim of this model is to estimate the dynamics of the money market rates to an unexpected
shock in the levels. To investigate the dynamic response following a shock, I estimate both
impulse response functions and conclude the analysis with a forecast variance decomposition.
The lag length selection is the same as described in the VECM estimating. Based on this
methodology I specify a VAR at each maturity of 1, 3 and 6 months, respectively.
Yt = c+
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i + t (12)
The vector Yt in Equation 12 accounts for 4 endogenous variables. t denotes the vector
of residuals. c is a 4x1 vector of intercepts. Also, dummy variables to control for calendar
effects and outlier events are included (not shown in Equation 12). Yt includes: unsecured
interbank rates, the OIS rate to proxy market expectation for future monetary policy, again the
median CDS spread of major Libor panel banks and the implied volatility extracted from federal
funds futures options to proxy uncertainty about funding risk. The main focus of this modeling
framework is on the adjustment of the unsecured interbank rates to an unexpected shock during
the financial crisis prior to the ZLB. I estimate a model for each maturity and interest rate to
compare the impacts at different maturities and instruments14. In order to obtain innovation
accounting, Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance covariance matrix is used to identify
extract orthogonal shocks from the residuals. The output following a Cholesky decomposition
relies very much on the ordering of the variables. Hence, different ordering is considered. Then,
impulse response functions (IRF) or forecast error impulse responses are obtained to measure
the impact of the variables to one unit of shock over time. All variables are integrated of order
one and therefore they are all subject to permanent shocks. I chose the unsecured interbank rate
to have immediate impact from all other shocks. I consider a forecast horizon up to a month.
Further, the forecast error variances decomposition shows the contribution of the movements
due to its innovations relative to other shocks. Additionally, I also perform Granger causality
(GC) tests to analyse the interrelationship between variables. For the GC testing I rely on the
methodology of Toda and Yamamoto [1995].
14In order to keep the model as lean as possible the model is restricted to those 4 variables. One could argue
that additional variables were useful.
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5 Findings
This section documents and discusses the findings from the three models presented above.
5.1 Co-movements of the money market spreads: 2007 to 2008
Given the importance of the LOIS and other Libor spreads during the crisis, I analyse their
joint dynamics in this section. At first, both Johansen and residual based tests give evidence
of a cointegration relationship between TED and LOIS spread at different maturities, but also
between Repo and LOIS spread (see Appendix A.3 and A.4). Table 4 represents the outputs
without exogenous control variables15. All statistically significant adjustment coefficients are
correctly signed. The coefficient for the LOIS spread is weakly exogenous with respect to the
cointegrating relationship16. Meaning that the LOIS spread does not adjust to deviations from
the equilibrium. The TED spread adjustment parameter, however, is significant and negative.
Replacing the TED with the Repo spread, one obtains similar results. However, the long-run
coefficient is larger which indicates stronger co-movements. The results imply that deviations in
the TED spread from long-run equilibrium have a half-life of roughly 7 to 8 days at all maturity
whereas the Repo spread only requires around 3 days. The adjustment in the Repo spread is
clearly faster than in the TED spread. This finding is no surprise as the Repo and OIS rate
are both financial instruments from the interbank market whereas the Treasury market also
attracts other investors. An interesting finding, however, is that there is no difference between
the maturity of the instruments. It seems as all term markets were impaired. Moreover, the
positive constant indicate a mark up for the liquidity risk between Tbill and OIS, Repo and
OIS rate respectively. I also estimated models for between OIS and Tbill or Repo rate. Both
cointegration tests and the model indicate a linear relationship. A model for Repo and OIS rate
for a reduced sample period prior to the Lehman collapse shows stronger co-movement of the two
rates and an one-to-one relationship between the rates, but with a lower speed of adjustment.
A possible explanation may be that over this short sample period, tight market conditions and
increased liquidity provision by the central bank weakened the interest rate channel to secured
rates.
The money market spreads adjust to the expectations of the future path of monetary policy.
I augment the model with a set of exogenous variables. Following crisis-literature such as
McAndrews et al. [2008] I control for the effects of policy announcements and whether they
influence (i) the speed of adjustment or (iii) the short-run dynamics of the money market spreads.
Additionally, I also add variables to control for calendar effects or effects from economic news.
The output of the augmented model with exogenous variables is listed in Table 2. The results
from the augmented model in Table 5 do not differ from those in Table 4 considerably, despite
decreasing the speed of adjustments slightly. As stated by Taylor and Williams [2009] if the risk
premium in unsecured markets was dominated by uncertainty about counterparty risk rather
than liquidity risk, the launch of liquidity programmes could hardly improve market conditions.
15The model is subject to ARCH effects. Since linear dynamics of the spreads are of main interest in this model,
this property was not modeled [Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004].
16LR test for H0 of α2=0 as proposed by Johansen were conducted. The H0 cannot be rejected for any model.
Hence, in all cases the LOIS spread is weakly exogenous with respect to the cointegrating relationship.
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long‐run constant speed of adjustment Half‐life Lags
β c α1 α2 kb (in diff.)
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
TED ‐ LOIS
1M 1.076(***) 0.699(***) ‐0.089(***) 0.01 7.4 2
3M 0.706(***) 0.835(***) ‐0.086(***) ‐0.005 7.7 4
6M 0.633(***) 0.675(***) ‐0.085(***) 0 7.8 2
Repo spread ‐ LOIS
3M 0.868(***) 0.322(***) ‐0.234(***) ‐0.011 2.6 4
Tbill ‐ OISa
1M 0.831(***) ‐0.299 ‐0.135(***) 0.004 4.8 6
3M 0.843(***) ‐0.179 ‐0.125(***) ‐0.002 5.2 6
6M 0.822(***) ‐0.145 ‐0.122(***) ‐0.035(*) 5.3 2
Repo ‐ OISa
3M 0.95(***) ‐0.053 ‐0.240(***) ‐0.012 2.5 7
08/09/2007 ‐ 08/30/2008
Repo ‐ OISa
3M 1.003(***) 0.239 ‐0.162(***) 0.0 3.92 6
Notes: a LR tests suggest a drift term in the VAR on differences. b |θ|<1.
(*), (**), and (***) denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1%.
Table 4: VECM spreads without exogenous variables
long‐run constant speed of adjustment Half‐life Lags
β c α1 α2 kb (in diff.)
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
TED ‐ LOIS
1M 1.085(***) 0.73(***) ‐0.083(***) 0.0 8.7 2
3M 0.689(***) 0.918(***) ‐0.085(***) 0.0 8.5 4
6M 0.633(***) 0.70(***) ‐0.084(***) 0.0 8.6 2
Repo spread ‐ LOIS
3M 0.871(***) 0.286(***) ‐0.236(***) ‐0.005 3.3 4
Notes:  b |θ|<1. (*), (**), and (***) denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1%.
Table 5: VECM spreads with exogenous variables
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
d(TED) d(LOIS) d(TED) d(LOIS) d(TED) d(LOIS) d(Repo spread) d(LOIS)
d(fftr) ‐0.15 0.10 * ‐0.03 0.12 ** ‐0.02 0.06 ‐0.10 0.11 ***
taf auction date ‐0.03 0.02 ‐0.06 0.03 ‐0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03
condition date ‐0.01 ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.03 ‐0.06 * ‐0.04 * ‐0.01 ‐0.02
internat. news 0.01 0.03 ‐0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01
domestic news ‐0.07 ‐0.08 * 0.03 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.10 ** ‐0.05 ‐0.05
Notes: (*), (**), and (***) denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1% level. Results from macro news and calender effects are omitted.
1M 6M 3M
Repo spread ‐ LOIS
3m
LOIS ‐ TED
Table 6: VECM: Exogenous variables
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The findings of the models including the exogenous variables are outlined in Table 6. There is
hardly any effect from augmenting the model exogenous variables. At this point, it is important
to recall: First, the central bank can only affect the liquidity risk, while credit risk depends
on the characteristics of the market participants. Second, the TAF measures did not change
the overall liquidity provision since the actions were neutralized through open market operations
until autumn 2008. Third, the limitations of the event study by using dummies to detect whether
the TAF auctions were effective was discussed by other authors (i.e. Wu [2008], McAndrews
et al. [2008]). The event windows are limited to one day. Given the amount of news during the
turmoil it seems sensitive to keep this window as short as possible. Different to papers following
Taylor and Williams [2009], the macro news releases are included to control for the fact that
market participants not only pay attention to communication by policy makers but also to news
about fundamentals.
In summary, according to these models, I find that there is a common trend to drive the
Libor spreads. In line with theoretical assumptions, secured markets adjust to changes in the
expected path of federal funds rate. In terms of the speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium,
there is no difference in the liquidity among the different maturities. However, I find that flight
to safety and/ or liquidity risk as incorporated in the difference between Tbill and OIS, Repo
rate, respectively, only to have a short-run effects. However, given an eye inspection17 as in
Figure 2, it shows that the near zero target range in December 2008, changed the relationship
between secured markets and hence the traditional interest rate channel completely. According
to this framework, announcements of the Fed’s liquidity programmes have hardly any affect on
money market spreads dynamics of maturities up to 6 months.
17A Chow Test on the difference between 3months Tbill-OIS rate confirms this assumption.
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03/03/2003 ‐ 12/15/2008
1M 3M 6M 1M 3M 6M 1M 3M 6M
ois 1.01 (***) 1.01 (***) 1.00 (***) 1.01 (***) 1.02 (***) 1.01 (***) 1.02 (***) 1.02 (***) 1.02 (***)
ffv 1.26 (***) 1.89 (***) 1.83 (***) 1.46 (***) 1.99 (***) 2.34 (***) 2.51 (***) 3.32 (***) 3.68 (***)
cds 0.53 (***) 0.71 (***) 0.90 (***) 0.68 (***) 1.01 (***) 0.97 (***) 0.71 (***) 0.97 (***) 1.15 (***)
constant ‐0.03 (*) ‐0.05 (***) ‐0.06 (***) ‐0.14 (***) ‐0.19 (***) ‐0.16 (***) ‐0.18 (***) ‐0.23 (***) ‐0.27 (***)
LIBOR CD rate ED rate
Notes: Lag length according to the Schwarz criteria. Newey‐West standard errors to compute the asymptotically valid standard errors for the coefficients. (*), (**), 
and (***) denote significance at 10, 5, and 1% level.
Table 7: Long-run relationship based on DOLS estimates
5.2 Transmission of monetary policy and money market volatility: 2003 to
2008
This model aims to estimate transmission of monetary policy, extending the model by Carpenter
and Demiralp [2011]. Estimation results for long-run relationship as in Equation 7 and the
error correction EGARCH model as in Equations 9 and 11 are summarised in Tables 7 and
8, respectively. Due to the results from cointegration testing, It seems reasonable to include
the CDS median as an additional variable to the long-run relation. The realised federal funds
volatility was not sufficient to restore the relationship between unsecured interbank rates and
monetary policy at 6 months. On the other hand, including only the CDS median without the
realised volatility, the residual based cointegration tests indicate a cointegration relationship18.
However, the residuals of the models showed stronger mean-reverting behaviour including both
CDS and realised volatility even at 3 months maturity. For models at one month maturity,
the test regression of no cointegration can be rejected between interbank rate and the overnight
swap but as for longer term rates, the cointegration relationship appears to be stronger including
both risk measures. Carpenter and Demiralp [2011] find the realised federal funds volatility to
be the missing link between monetary policy and interbank rates at 3 months maturity but
they refer to a longer sample period. Turning to the regression outputs presented in Table 7,
the most notable finding is the role of realised volatility on ED rates while the response of the
Libor rate at different maturities terms is remarkably lower. The size of the impact on Libor
dynamics resembles those of the CD rates. The CD market is an alternative funding source
for financial institutions where banks can borrow from consumers. In previous literature (see
for example Thornton [2009]) it was often argued that if the interbank market were liquidity
constrained, the spread between Libor and CD rate would increase as the lenders would charge
a higher risk premium on the Libor rate compared to the CD rate, which market is less liquidity
constraint. Concerning the impact of the OIS rate, the findings are in line with the ones from
Carpenter and Demiralp [2011]. However, unlike them, my estimated coefficients using dynamic
OLS are super-consistent. On top of that, the findings also indicate that there is a one-to-one
relationship between interbank funding costs and expected future federal funds rate from 1 up
to 6 months.
18These test output are not documented to save space.
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Table 8 outlines the findings from the error correction model19. One can see that the variables
are cointegrated as all error correction terms are correctly signed and significant. The rates
adjust to changes in monetary policy and risk measures. Rates at lower maturities adjust more
strongly to restore the equilibrium relationship, in other words they are less liquidity constrained.
Also, according to these outputs, overall the adjustments in the CD market are stronger than
those in the Libor and ED market, implying that the CD market is more liquid. However, all
of the adjustment coefficients appear to be rather small. Concerning the surprise component
of a target rate change, the impact has changed after August 2007. Surprisingly, the effect on
the interbank rates has increased during the crisis.20 To control for the announcement effects,
I estimated twice: first only including the auction dates of the TAF and secondly, I re-run the
regression with a larger set of dummies by McAndrews et al. [2008]21. The EGARCH turned
out to be sensitive to the number of parameters. Some of the announcements lowered the mean
of the rates. The effects are small. On the other hand, TAF announcements tend to have
stabilised volatility of the Libor to greater extent. Also, there are signs of asymmetric responses
to innovations in the ED and CDS rates at 3 and 6 months maturity. The model implies that
since coefficient are negative, the response of the conditional variance to a positive shock at the
previous period is lower than the response to a negative shock. Another finding is the increased
volatility after a monetary policy surprise prior to the crisis for both Libor and ED rates, but
during the crisis this increase is less pronounced. One possible explanation may be that the
overall heightened volatility in the markets (see the positive signs of the shift dummies for the
post-Lehman and the crisis period), dampened the effect of a target rate change. Former work by
Nautz and Schmidt [2009] suggested that the introduction of interests paid on reserves, reduces
overnight volatility. The effect on money markets volatility is less clear. Whereas the volatility
of ED rates was stabilised, there is no sign that the interest paid on excess reserves calmed the
Libor.
In summary, I find that monetary policy expectations in combination with credit and liquidity
risk measures drive the unsecured interbank rates. Additionally, market liquidity, as measured
by the speed of adjustment coefficients, appears to differ between the Libor and CD market.
Overall, I find an immediate pass through measured by the unexpected target rate change on
the mean, but hardly any effects from the TAF announcements during the crisis. On the money
market volatility, however, the effects of target rate changes were less pronounced during the
crisis than before. In contrast, on the TAF auction days, the Libor’s volatility lowered.
19Again, findings from macro news or calendar effects are omitted to save space.
20Estimates of surprise component may be biased due to the fact that there was more than target rate change
a month in January and October 2008.
21Carpenter et al. [2013] updated the set. The data is available on request.
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5.3 Dynamics of the interbank rates after a shock: 2007 to 2008
The volatility of the overnight market is typically mainly driven by financial institutions’ liquidity
concerns. In times of turmoil when markets are under pressure, uncertainty about the course
of future monetary policy may occur. Heterogeneous views about of the central bank’s policy
intentions may have a significant impact on the movements in the overnight market. Whereas
in the EGARCH framework I use realised volatility which is linked to the banks’ liquidity
management, this model includes a measure more closely related to uncertainty about the future
path of monetary policy.
The aim of this model is to identify the dynamics of unsecured interbank rates after a
shock without modeling long-run relationships between the variables between 2007 to 2008.
Figures in the Appendix A.6 contain the impulse response functions of the interbank rates after
a shock in the OIS rate, CDS and federal funds volatility. I chose that all measure to have a
contemporaneous impact on the interbank rate22. I compared results from alternative orderings.
Different ordering did not qualitatively change the results, especially in the case for the implied
volatility. The magnitude of the shocks is small relative to the interest rates’ own shocks not to
blur responses from the other shocks. The most striking finding is the impact of an OIS shock
on the Libor at different maturities. Compared to the other rates, the magnitude of the impulse
is rather small at 3 and 6 months maturity. Not only have the monetary policy shocks had a
small effect, but also the credit risk. At 3 months maturity, there is no immediate impact, only
after 7 days. The effect, however, increases and over passes the impulse from the OIS rate after
around two weeks. I also estimated a model with maturity of one week where the dynamics
are completely different with hardly any impact from shocks in risk. For the CD rate and ED
rate, on the other hand, the control of monetary policy is larger than for the Libor at the same
maturities. The ED rates show some overshooting response to credit risk shocks after 2 to 3
days. Interestingly, the effect is larger, the shorter the maturity of the rate. The effect decreases
after a week and co-moves with the response shock in monetary policy expectations. Overall,
hardly any positive reaction follows after a liquidity shock proxied by the federal funds volatility
and if only at 1 month maturity of the ED rate. The reaction turns out to be even negative.
For further robustness, I also applied generalised impulse response functions as an identification
technique. However, findings did not fundamentally change. Tables in the Appendix A.7 display
the variance decomposition of each of the spreads on the first, fifth, tenth, 15th and 20th day
after a shock. Again, as in the impulse response functions, the rates account for the major part
of its own variability. Especially, in the case of the Libor at 3 and 6 months other shocks only
account for around 8 to 11 percent of the Libor’s volatility after 20 days, while other shocks
account for 30 to 50 percent. The variability primarily attributes to the credit risk shocks
and monetary policy shocks. Appendix A.5 presents the findings from the GC testing. For
comparison, I also present GC testing for VARs including 3 months GC repo and Tbill rate as
well as the variance decomposition of the models. One can observe the different dynamics in
comparison to unsecured interbank rates.
In summary, I find hardly any evidence that shocks in the federal funds IV affected interbank
rates. CD and ED rates show stronger adjustment after a shock in monetary policy expectations,
22Cholesky ordering: CDS - OIS - ffiv - interbank rate.
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than the Libor rate.
6 Conclusion
The money markets play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy. The Fed controls
the amount of bank reserves and therefore that the federal funds rate stays close to the target
rate. Via the expectation of future target rate changes, the central bank is albe to influence
longer-term rates. The 3 months Libor, a rate in the unsecured money market, has become the
benchmark for pricing a large number of various financial contracts and thereby affecting the
entire economy. This mechanism is called the interest rate channel. Pre-crisis literature studies
the link between money market rates and finds that expectations over monetary policy drive the
interest rates in the long-run. The turmoil of the financial crisis deeply distorted this channel
and turned attention to the functioning of the interbank markets.
The objective of this paper is to extend crisis and pre-crisis literature of the interest rate channel
and to analyse the long and short-term links between money market rates and monetary policy
in an environment of heightened uncertainty. By the end of 2008, when reserve levels increased
and hence the overnight rates fell near zero, the U.S. central bank employed other operational
targets than the federal funds rate. I therefore limit my sample to December 2008. I estimate
three different empirical models to evaluate the interest rate channel.
First, using a VECM model, I find that Libor spreads move together during the financial crisis
due to the link between monetary policy expectations and secured rates. Moreover, I find
them to adjust to expectations about future monetary policy target rate changes over the same
term as indicated by theoretical assumptions. Second, similar to pre-crisis pass-through models,
I investigate the interest rate channel to unsecured interbank rates. I employ a dynamic OLS
model for the long-run relationship and further an EGARCH framework with an error correction
term. Considering the pass-through to the unsecured interbank rates, I find that the relationship
deteriorated since rates are subject to additional drivers such as credit and liquidity risk. In
addition, although sharing a similar exposure to counterparty risk, the CD market is more
liquid than the ED and Libor markets. The finding of the CD market may contribute to the
growing theoretical papers that study the channels by which shocks can lead to evaporation of
market liquidity. Also, I find that announcement effects of the liquidity programmes tended to
stabilise the money market volatility. The third empirical model, a simple VAR, investigates
the dynamics of interbank rates after a shock. Findings indicate that interbank rates respond to
innovations in credit risk and monetary policy. Given the findings from the models, I conclude
that unsecured interbank markets disconnected from monetary policy expectations and are now
subject to additional long-run trends. On the other hand, secured money market instruments
such as Treasury bills or the general collateral repurchase agreements, still co-moved and also
adjusted to changes in monetary policy expectations. They only diverged in the short-run. The
increasing amounts of reserves and overnight rates near zero, however, marked the beginning of a
new policy framework with a change in the operational target. After all, one has to acknowledge
the fact that all term markets were deeply disrupted. Interbank funding concentrated on very
short-term loans, mostly overnight. This raises the question about the reliability of the findings
in studies covering longer term money market rates. Nevertheless, in the light of the discussion
25
about an adequate "exit strategy" from the current environment with high liquidity in the
banking system, one has to re-evaluate the traditional interest rate channel and possibly also
the choice of the reference rate.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variables
Name  Description Literature Source
libor Libor
London interbank offered rate at 1 week, 1, 3, and 6 months 
maturity. Collected around 11 a.m. London time. Adjusted 
for one day according to previous literature.
Taylor and  Williams, 2008 Bloomberg
cd CD rate 
Certificate of deposit rate at 1, 3, and 6 months maturity. 
Collected around 8 to 9.45 am NY time.
Sarno and Thornton, 2003; 
Taylor and  Williams, 2008; 
Thornton, 2009
Bloomberg
ed ED rate
Eurodollar deposit rate at 1, 3, and 6 months maturity. 
Collected around 9.30 am NY time.
Taylor and  Williams, 2008; 
Zhou, 2007; Colarossi and  
Zaghini, 2009
Bloomberg
ois OIS rate
Overnight index swap at 1week and 1, 3, and 6 months 
maturity.
Taylor and  Williams, 2008 Bloomberg
tbill Tbill rate
Treasury bill rate, secondary market at 1, 3 and 6 months 
maturity.
Sarno and Thornton, 2003; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007
Bloomberg
repo GC Repo rate
General collateral repurchase agreements at 3 months 
maturity.
Hoerdahl and King, 2008 Bloomberg
lois LOIS spread Libor‐OIS spread
ted TED spread Libor‐Tbill spread
tep Repo spread Libor‐GC repo spread
cds CDS median 
Median of credit default swaps, 5 years maturity, from the 
banks:  
BOFA , BOTM, BACR , CINC, CRDSUI, DB , HSBC BK, 
JPMCC, LLOY, RABOBK, NORBK, RBOS, UBS
i.a. Taylor and  Williams, 2008 Bloomberg
fftr Target rate Federal funds target rate FRED
ffv
Realised FF 
volatility 
Absolute average deviation from the target rate over the 
last 30 days.
Hilton, 2005; Carpenter and 
Demiralp, 2011
FRED
ffiv
Implied vola FF 
futures options
Log of implied volatility from Federal funds futures (2nd 
Nearby) options. Average of put and call options IV.
Neely, 2004 Bloomberg
news Macro news
Announcements of macro news such as: Consumer 
confidence, retail sales, production  and unemployment. 
Surprise component is extracted by deducting the median 
from the Bloomberg survey and standardised by dividing it 
through its standard deviation.
Andersen et al. 2002; Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher, 2007; 
Moessner and Nelson, 2008
Bloomberg
fs MP surprise
Suprise component of a target rate change extracted from 
the Federal funds futures rate (1st Nearby).
Kuttner, 2001 Bloomberg
D TAF TAF effects
Term auctions facility announcements as: Auction date, 
condition date, international and domestic news, and 
notification date. For a description refer to McAndrews et 
al. 2009. Each series accounts for 1 at the announcement 
date, and 0 otherwise.
McAndrews et al. 2009; 
Carpenter et al., 2013
Bloomberg/ 
Literature
D FOMC FOMC
Accounts for 1 on the days the Federal Open Market 
Committee takes place and 0 otherwise.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2007; Nautz and Schmidt, 2009
Bloomberg
D IOR IOR Dummy
Shift dummy for the time when the Fed started paying 
interest on reserves: 1 from Oct 9, 2008 and 0 before.
Nautz and Schmidt, 2009 ‐
D crisis Crisis Dummy Shift dummy that includes 1 from Aug 9, 2007 and 0 before. ‐ ‐
D postLB
Post‐Lehman 
Dummy
Shift dummy that includes 1 from Sept 15, 2008 and 0 
before.
‐ ‐
X Calender effects
3 vectors for the last business day of the month, quarter 
and year denoting 1 at those days, 0 otherwise.
i.a. Hamilton, 1996 ‐
X Events 
Aug 9, 2007, March 14, and Sept 15, 2008 denotes 1, 0 
otherwise.
‐ ‐
Table 9: List of variables
I
A.2 Unit root and stationarity tests
Before starting with the empirical analysis, I first determined the order of integration of the
variables using various testing techniques: (i) Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), (ii) Philips-
Perron (PP), (iii) Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmid-Shin (KPSS) and (iiii) Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock
(ERS) test.
The following two test regression are considered for the ADF in case of interest rates and
risk measures. From an economic perspective, it is not obvious to include a drift term for an
interest rate over a longer period of time. However, to be in line with previous literature, I test
both: H0 of random walk with 14 and without drift 13 against the alternative hypothesis of
an autoregressive process with nonzero mean, and zero mean, respectively. The spreads, on the
other hand, are only tested with the first test regression without a drift term in the regression.
∆yt = α0yt−1 +
p∑
i=1
βi∆yt−i + t (13)
∆yt = c+ α0yt−1 +
p∑
i=1
βi∆yt−i + t (14)
One can reject H0 of a unit root if α0<0. The null and alternative hypothesis are the
same for both, ADF and PP test. The only difference is that the ADF test extends the model
with extra parameters accounting for serial correlation among the innovations. In the case of
stationary series but with strong autocorrelation, ADF and PP tends not to reject the H0 of a
unit root. This problem especially occurs in the case of small sample sizes. Therefore I also test
for stationarity using the KPSS method which is the inverse of the PP test. I run the following
regression:
yt = xt + et (15)
xt = xt−1 + vt (16)
With et being a stationary process and yt is regressed on an exogenous variable called xt
which is a random walk with vt being an i.i.d. process with a zero-mean and a variance of σ2.
Under the H0 σ2=0. The alternative hypothesis is σ2> 0, which means that the random walk
contains a unit root. Alternatively, I also applied another unit root test with stronger power in
small sample sizes, the ERS test. The ERS is similar to the ADF, but with generalised least
square detrending.
To ensure that the variables can be treated as I(1) processes, I re-run the regressions on the
first differences of the variables. Please note that these test regressions for the first differences
do not include a c in the case of ADF and PP.
The 10 provides an overview of the variables at various sample periods tested.
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A.3 Single regression cointegration tests
All variables can be treated as I(1) processes, hence it is sensible to test for common stochastic
trends since in the case of cointegration, simple differencing is a model misspecification as long-
term information appear in levels.. The concept of cointegration implies that there is a long-run
equilibrium with nonstationary variables. Those variables, however, embed a stationary linear
combination of variables. Equilibrium relationship indicates that there is no deviation in the
long-run, however, variables may diverge from the equilibrium in the short run [Enders, 2010,
p. 356-365]. Tests conducted in this paper are single regression tests by (i) Engle Granger (EG)
and (ii) Phillips Ouliaris (PO).
The EG two-step methodology is a unit root test on the residuals of the test regression 17.
Since residuals are estimated, one needs to apply different critical values than for the ADF.
yt = c+ β1xt + υt (17)
Recall that the EG approach can only identify a single cointegrating relationship. PO also
tests the non stationarity of the υt.
The results from single regression cointegrating testing are summarised in Tables 11 to 13.
REPO spread ‐ 
LOIS
1M 3M 6M 3M
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
EngleGranger cointegrated (***) cointegrated (**) cointegrated (**) cointegrated (**)
Phillips Ouliaris cointegrated (***) cointegrated (**) cointegrated (**) cointegrated (***)
Notes: Lag length determined with SIC. (*), (**), (***) denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1%.
Test regressions include a constant term.
TED ‐ LOIS
Table 11: Single cointegration regression testing for the spreads
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A.4 Johansen methodology
Different to EG and PO whose regressions are estimated with OLS, maximum likelihood is
applied, avoiding conditional estimates. The Johansen procedure relies on the relationship
between rank "‘r"’ of a matrix Π and it characteristic roots. It is a multivariate generalisation
of the Dickey-Fuller test [Enders, 2010, pp. 385-387].
∆Yt = ΠYt−1 +
n−1∑
k=1
Γk∆Yt−k + t (18)
Note that the VECM on the single interest rates is augmented with a drift term during.
∆Yt = c+ ΠYt−1 +
n−1∑
k=1
Γk∆Yt−k + t (19)
The results from the Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration procedure for the bivariate
VECM are summarised in Table 14. The test results for the H0 of r≤1 and r=1 for the Trace
and Maximum eigenvalue, respectively are omitted. However, in all cases the H0 cannot be
rejected at 5 per cent.
Maximal eigenvalue 
statistics
Trace eigenvalue 
statistics
P‐value for H0 of no 
cointegration r=0; 
against H1 of r=1
P‐value for H0 of no 
cointegration r=0; 
against H1 of r>0
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
TED ‐ LOIS
1M 0.04 0.03
3M 0.05 0.04
6M 0.02 0.04
Repo spread ‐ LOIS
3M 0.00 0.00
Tbill ‐ OISa 1M 0.00 0.00
3M 0.01 0.01
6M 0.05 0.04
Repo ‐ OISa 3M 0.00 0.00
Notes: a LR tests suggest a drift in the VAR in differences.
Table 14: Johansen test for the spreads
VII
VIII
A.5 Granger causality tests
df interbank rate ois cds ffiv
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
LIBOR 1week 9
ois(***)
cds(***)
ffiv
ALL(***)
libor
cds
ffiv
ALL
libor (**)
ois
ffiv 
ALL (**)
libor
ois (***)
cds (**)
ALL (***)
1M 3
ois 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL 
libor (***)
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (***)
libor (**)
ois 
ffiv 
ALL (**)
libor 
ois
cds (**)
ALL (***)
3M 10
ois (*)
cds (*)
ffiv 
ALL 
libor (***)
cds (*)
ffiv (**)
ALL (***)
libor 
ois 
ffiv 
ALL 
libor 
ois 
cds (**)
ALL (***)
6M 11
ois 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL 
libor (***)
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (***)
libor 
ois 
ffiv 
ALL 
libor (**)
ois 
cds 
ALL (***)
CD 1M 3
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
cd 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL 
cd (**)
ois (**)
ffiv 
ALL (**)
cd 
ois 
cds (**)
ALL (***)
3M 3
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
cd 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL 
cd (*)
ois (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
cd 
ois (*)
cds (**)
ALL (***)
6M 8
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
cd 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL 
cd 
ois 
ffiv 
ALL 
cd 
ois (*)
cds 
ALL (*)
ED 1M 7
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
ed (***)
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (***)
ed (***)
ois 
ffiv 
ALL (**)
ed 
ois (*)
cds (**)
ALL (**)
3M 8
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
ed (**)
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (***)
ed 
ois 
ffiv 
ALL 
ed 
ois 
cds (**)
ALL (***)
6M 6
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
ed 
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (*)
ed 
ois (**)
ffiv 
ALL (*)
ed 
ois 
cds (**)
ALL (**)
REPO 3M 8
ois (***)
cds (***)
ffiv (***)
ALL (***)
repo (**)
cds 
ffiv (**)
ALL (***)
repo (**)
ois (**)
ffiv 
ALL (**)
repo 
ois 
cds (*)
ALL (*)
TBILL 3M 7
ois (**)
cds (***)
ffiv 
ALL (***)
tbill (***)
cds 
ffiv 
ALL (***)
tbill 
ois 
ffiv 
ALL 
tbill 
ois 
cds (**)
ALL (***)
dependant variable
Notes: According to Toda and Yamamoto, 1995. (*), (**), and (***) denotes significance at 10, 
5, and 1% level.
Table 15: Granger causality tests for VARIX
A.6 Impulse response functions
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Table 16: Responses of Libor of 1, 3 and 6 months
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Table 17: Responses of 1week Libor
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Table 18: Responses of CD rate of 1, 3 and 6 months
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Table 19: Responses of ED rate of 1, 3 and 6 months
X
A.7 Variance decomposition
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
1 week 1M 3M 6M
horizon cds ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv 
1 2.09 0.12 0.84 0.57 7.56 1.19 0.03 10.17 1.48 0.00 15.81 0.48
5 0.42 12.59 0.27 1.98 10.60 0.73 0.30 7.75 0.41 1.33 10.34 0.14
10 0.68 16.63 0.55 4.27 14.84 0.37 0.83 5.11 0.16 2.80 5.79 0.13
15 0.47 16.81 0.47 6.48 18.75 0.55 2.67 3.33 0.29 4.57 3.46 0.61
20 0.41 17.13 0.81 7.60 22.25 0.88 4.88 2.52 0.75 6.34 2.57 1.57
Notes: Choleski ordering: cds ‐ ois ‐ ffiv ‐ libor
LIBOR
Table 20: Variance decomposition LIBOR models
08/09/2007 ‐ 12/15/2008
1M 3M 6M
horizon cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv 
1 2.21 0.88 0.04 0.86 0.02 0.09 0.26 4.06 0.22
5 2.33 9.10 0.38 2.91 6.27 0.74 1.50 14.70 0.24
10 5.89 15.49 0.65 8.76 10.61 3.02 1.21 20.35 0.69
15 8.13 20.16 1.32 12.98 13.26 5.14 2.77 24.96 1.81
20 9.96 23.91 2.04 15.43 15.04 6.80 4.67 28.34 2.99
1M 3M 6M
horizon cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv 
1 0.78 0.21 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.68 1.54 0.42
5 11.44 3.71 0.58 13.30 5.62 0.34 8.68 12.68 0.32
10 11.76 8.41 1.41 1.05 21.22 22.25 10.28 12.90 0.26
15 13.33 13.19 1.00 18.30 19.01 0.58 11.39 14.15 0.82
20 14.52 16.85 0.83 20.36 23.30 0.44 12.44 15.47 1.88
3M 3M
horizon cds  ois  ffiv  cds  ois  ffiv 
1 3.02 3.81 0.28 6.07 15.78 0.12
5 10.79 26.50 1.26 20.54 24.76 0.57
10 11.15 47.19 3.29 27.38 31.85 0.72
15 15.24 53.45 2.56 34.39 33.40 0.70
20 17.68 56.08 2.12 38.05 33.85 1.04
Notes: Choleski ordering: cds ‐ ois ‐ ffiv ‐ money market rate
TBILL
CD rate
ED rate
REPO rate
Table 21: Variance decomposition VAR models
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